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MAKE, BUY, OR ALLY: A TRANSACTION COST THEORY
META-ANALYSIS
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Tilburg University
JAN-BENEDICT E. M. STEENKAMP
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
NIRMALYA KUMAR
London Business School
Since the publication of Williamson’s Markets and Hierarchies, many empirical
articles have investigated the tenets of transaction cost theory. Using meta-analytic
techniques, we quantitatively synthesized and evaluated transaction cost–based em-
pirical research on organizational boundary (make, buy, or ally) decisions. We found
strong support for the theory for both make versus buy and ally versus buy decisions.
However, we did not find evidence that asset specificity had stronger predictive power
than uncertainty. Hierarchical and relational governance appropriately aligned with
transaction dimensions both led to enhanced performance. On the basis of our meta-
analysis, we provide directions for future research.
Transaction cost theory has become the predom-
inant theoretical framework for explaining organi-
zational boundary decisions. Like most influential
theories, transaction cost theory was not fully de-
veloped at the outset. It has been and continues to
be refined and reformulated, corrected and ex-
panded, in response to new theoretical and empir-
ical developments. The basic premise of transac-
tion cost theory has its origins in Coase’s (1937)
classic article, The Nature of the Firm, in which he
described markets and hierarchies as alternative
governance structures. Coase argued that the choice
between markets and hierarchies was determined
principally by differences in transaction costs.
However, the difficulty of directly measuring trans-
action costs resulted in Coase’s 1937 article being
“much cited and little used” (Coase, 1972: 67).
The operationalization problem of transaction
cost theory was resolved by Williamson, who dem-
onstrated that testable hypotheses could be devel-
oped by associating the relative efficiency of alter-
native governance structures with observable
dimensions of transactions, namely asset specific-
ity, uncertainty, and transaction frequency. Efforts
to subject transaction cost theory to empirical test-
ing began shortly after the publication of William-
son’s (1975) seminal book Markets and Hierarchies
and have continued unabated since then in a vari-
ety of disciplines. Now, about three decades later,
few other organizational frameworks have been
studied for a longer period of time or have been
accorded as much scholarly attention as transac-
tion cost theory.
Despite the large number of empirical studies
conducted to test transaction cost theory—or per-
haps because of this large number—insights from
transaction cost applications have not always been
cumulative. Two specific challenges hamper re-
searchers who try to build on the existing transac-
tion cost literature. First, there is the breadth of
transaction cost research to contend with. Though
the extant empirical research has led to important
refinements of early versions of the transaction cost
framework, many of these refinements have ap-
peared in different disciplines, including econom-
ics, organization, law, sociology, marketing, fi-
nance, accounting, and operations management.
Unfortunately, the lack of integration across these
different disciplines has limited their overall im-
pact on the development of transaction cost theory.
Second, even within a given discipline, the depth
of transaction cost theory has been a problem. The
past 30 years have witnessed a veritable explosion
of research efforts. In a recent narrative review of
the transaction cost literature covering multiple so-
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cial science disciplines, Boerner and Macher (2002)
identified more than 600 articles that investigate
some aspect of transaction cost theory. Transaction
cost theory has grown so large in both breadth
(number of disciplines) and depth (number of stud-
ies within disciplines) that it seems desirable to
bring into sharper quantitative focus this diverse
and sizable literature.
To date, several authors have presented narrative
reviews of transaction cost theory (e.g., Boerner &
Macher, 2002; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Shelan-
ski & Klein, 1995). Recently, a review using the
vote-counting method, which consists of a tabula-
tion of significant and nonsignificant findings, ap-
peared (David & Han, 2004). Although bringing
some degree of coalescence to a broad field, these
reviews leave several issues unaddressed. Through
this meta-analysis, we aim to contribute to the
transaction cost literature in the following ways:
First, to the best of our knowledge, no study has
quantitatively synthesized the empirical research
over a wide variety of disciplines and studies, al-
though such a synthesis would result in significant
gains of inferential power over traditional narrative
reviews and vote-counting methods.
Second, the lack of quantitative integration limits
a full understanding of the relative importance of
the transaction dimensions vis-a`-vis governance
choice. Researchers have rarely examined all trans-
action dimensions in the same study or attempted
to compare the effects of each.
Third, doubts have been raised as to the ade-
quacy of the explanation of relational governance
modes provided by transaction cost theory. Zajac
and Olsen (1993) contended that transaction cost
theory’s exclusive focus on single-party cost mini-
mization provides little insight into relational gov-
ernance, which is not only about cost minimization
but also about joint value maximization. In addi-
tion, Noorderhaven (1994) maintained that transac-
tion cost theory pictures governance structures as
the fruits of planned and intentional action,
whereas relational governance modes can also have
spontaneous origins in the accumulation of trust
over time. As a result, the deliberative choice as-
sumed by transaction cost theory may not always
be implicated in the case of relational governance
modes. This analysis has provoked the question of
whether transaction cost theory can be “stretched”
to explain relational governance modes.
Finally, the normative implications of transac-
tion cost theory have been questioned (Dyer, 1997;
Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), partly because empirical
findings have been divergent with respect to the
effect of governance choice on performance. The
divergent and often inconsistent results may be a
consequence of endogeneity bias (Masten, 1993), as
the majority of studies have assessed the effect of
governance choice on performance without ac-
counting for the fact that firms purposely, as op-
posed to randomly, choose their governance modes
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Through our meta-
analysis, we provide more insight into the relation
between governance choice and performance by
explicitly incorporating the selection decision.
TRANSACTION COST HYPOTHESES
Transaction Cost Theory and Hierarchical
Governance
The central question of transaction cost theory is
whether a transaction is more efficiently performed
within a firm (vertical integration) or outside it, by
autonomous contractors (market governance).
Transactors are assumed to be “boundedly ration-
al” and “risk neutral,” and at least some actors are
assumed to be “opportunistic.” The a priori trans-
action cost theory assumption is that market gover-
nance is more efficient than vertical integration
owing to the benefits of competition. Transactions
within integrated companies may be insulated from
competitive pressure and subject to bureaucratic
phenomena. However, certain dimensions of trans-
actions raise transaction costs and combine to cre-
ate “market failure,” making vertical integration
more efficient than market governance. These di-
mensions are asset specificity, uncertainty, and
transaction frequency (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
According to transaction cost theory, economic or-
ganization is an effort to “align transactions, which
differ in their attributes, with governance struc-
tures, which differ in their costs and competencies,
in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost econ-
omizing) way” (Williamson, 1991: 79).
Transaction-specific assets are assets that are tai-
lored to a particular transaction and cannot be eas-
ily redeployed outside the relationship of the par-
ties to the transaction. Their idiosyncratic nature
gives rise to a safeguarding problem, because mar-
ket competition will not restrain opportunistic ex-
ploitation. The solution to the safeguarding prob-
lem identified in transaction cost theory is vertical
integration. In contrast to markets, the authority
relationships and hierarchical control procedures
available through vertical integration are assumed
to embody greater safeguarding capabilities.
The second dimension, uncertainty, arises either
when the relevant contingencies surrounding an
exchange are too unpredictable to be specified ex
ante in a contract (there is environmental uncer-
tainty) or performance cannot be easily verified ex
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post (there is behavioral uncertainty). The primary
consequence of environmental uncertainty is an
adaptation problem; that is, difficulties with adjust-
ing agreements raise transaction costs, a problem
that can be addressed through hierarchical gover-
nance. However, a number of authors have argued
that high environmental uncertainty also encour-
ages firms to maintain flexibility, which would ar-
gue against hierarchical governance. As Klein
noted, “It appears that uncertainty is too broad a
concept and that different facets of it lead to both a
desire for flexibility and a motivation to reduce
transaction costs” (1989: 256). Different ways of
splitting the environmental uncertainty construct
have been proposed (Klein, 1989; Walker & Weber,
1984). In this study, we adopted Walker and
Weber’s (1984) classification. They extended Wil-
liamson’s basic framework by distinguishing be-
tween two types of environmental uncertainty: vol-
ume uncertainty and technological uncertainty.
Their classification has become particularly influ-
ential, and our meta-analysis tested its relevance
for understanding governance choice.
Volume uncertainty is the inability to accurately
forecast the volume requirements in a relationship
(Walker & Weber, 1984). When volume uncertainty
is high, suppliers experience unexpected produc-
tion costs or excess capacity, and buyers experi-
ence “stock-outs” or excess inventory. Since a firm
should be able to coordinate variations in a hierar-
chically organized production stream more effi-
ciently than variations occurring with market sup-
pliers, volume uncertainty should increase the
likelihood of hierarchical over market governance.
Technological uncertainty is the inability to accu-
rately forecast the technical requirements in a rela-
tionship (Walker & Weber, 1984). Such uncertainty
may follow from unpredictable changes in the stan-
dards or specifications of components or end prod-
uct, or from general technological developments.
Unlike volume uncertainty, which motivates hier-
archical governance to facilitate adaptation, tech-
nological uncertainty is managed more efficiently
through market governance. By using market gov-
ernance, firms retain the flexibility to terminate
relationships and switch to partners with more ap-
propriate technological capabilities (Balakrishnan
& Wernerfelt, 1986), and they avoid being locked
into a technology that may become obsolete (Heide
& John, 1990).
The effect of behavioral uncertainty is a perfor-
mance evaluation problem—that is, difficulty in
ascertaining ex post whether contractual compli-
ance has taken place. According to transaction cost
theory, the general response to the performance
evaluation problem is vertical integration. The
greater degree of control available through vertical
integration is assumed to embody greater evalua-
tion capabilities.
The complete transaction cost framework also
includes transaction frequency, although this con-
struct has received limited attention in the transac-
tion cost literature. Transaction frequency refers to
the extent to which transactions recur. Williamson
(1985) argued that transaction frequency provides
an incentive for firms to employ hierarchical gov-
ernance because the overhead cost of hierarchical
governance will be easier to recover for recurring
transactions. We did not include transaction fre-
quency in this meta-analysis because of the lack of
research including this construct. Rindfleisch and
Heide noted in 1997 that transaction frequency had
received far less attention in the empirical litera-
ture than asset specificity and uncertainty, and this
has not changed.
The conceptual and empirical research launched
in the shadow of Williamson’s (1975) book led to
the proposition that asset specificity is the critical
determinant of the choice between markets and
hierarchies (Williamson, 1985). Indeed, transaction
cost theory maintains that “asset specificity is the
big locomotive to which transaction cost econom-
ics owes much of its predictive content” (William-
son, 1998: 36). Williamson’s contention that asset
specificity is the critical driver has been supported
by much other research, including prior reviews
(e.g., David & Han, 2004; Shelanski & Klein, 1995).
Subsequent theoretical extensions have shown
that the benefits of vertical integration stem not
from ownership or integration per se, but rather
from the ability to exercise decision control (Heide,
1994). As Stinchcombe argued, the ability to govern
by means of authority is not limited to intrafirm
settings, but also can be achieved between firms by
means of contractual provisions, which essentially
“produce the effects of hierarchies” (Stinchcombe,
1985: 165). Therefore, following Stinchcombe
(1985) and Heide (1994), we define hierarchical
governance as explicitly based on enforcement by
means of legitimate authority, either through an
employment relation or a contractual arrangement
that provides decision-making authority in certain
areas.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the original
transaction cost framework prediction is that un-
certainty is only problematic in the presence of
specific assets. Uncertainty coupled with transac-
tion-specific assets demands hierarchical gover-
nance, since uncertainty allows for expropriation
when a party’s investment is exposed. Uncertainty
without transaction-specific assets favors the mar-
ket. If asset specificity is absent and thus potential
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transaction partners are numerous, a new transac-
tion arrangement can easily be arranged if neces-
sary (Williamson, 1975). The effect of uncertainty
on governance choice thus is conditional on asset
specificity being present to a nontrivial degree.
In summary, we set out to assess the generaliz-
ability of transaction cost theory’s classic frame-
work over a wide variety of available studies and
tested the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. As asset specificity increases,
hierarchical governance becomes preferred
over market governance.
Hypothesis 2. As volume uncertainty in-
creases, hierarchical governance becomes pre-
ferred over market governance.
Hypothesis 3. As technological uncertainty in-
creases, market governance becomes preferred
over hierarchical governance.
Hypothesis 4. As behavioral uncertainty in-
creases, hierarchical governance becomes pre-
ferred over market governance.
Hypothesis 5. Asset specificity has a greater
effect than uncertainty on choices between hi-
erarchical and market governance.
Hypothesis 6. The transaction dimensions in-
teract in shaping governance choice.
Transaction Cost Theory and Relational
Governance
Originally, transaction cost theory focused on the
dichotomy between market and hierarchical gover-
nance. However, researchers have argued that
transaction cost theory overstates the desirability of
integration and of explicit contractual safeguards to
protect against transaction hazards (Poppo &
Zenger, 2002). This view recognizes that in many
industries managers engage in collaborative ex-
changes (Dyer, 1997). That is, relational governance
(alliance) may be a viable alternative to hierarchy
when the market fails.
Relational governance modes incorporate a large
informal component and are therefore not easily
legally enforceable. Instead, nonjuridical mecha-
nisms such as mutual dependence, trust, parallel
expectations, joint action, and procedural fairness
sustain them (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). They are
usually open-ended relationships, with no finite or
foreseeable termination points (Heide, 1994). The
mechanisms through which relational governance
mitigates exchange hazards are both economic and
sociological. Economists emphasize the rational,
calculative origins of relational governance, em-
phasizing expectations of payoffs from future coop-
erative behavior that prompt present cooperation
(Axelrod, 1984). In this view, if trust arises, it is
carefully calculated. Sociologists emphasize shared
values and affective feelings that emerge from a
history of trustworthy interactions (Uzzi, 1997). De-
spite differences, both economists and sociologists
have argued that repeated exchanges provide infor-
mation about the cooperative behavior of exchange
partners that may allow for informed choices of
whom to trust or not trust (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
In addition, both economists and sociologists have
argued that relational governance operates as a self-
enforcing safeguard: the value of a future relation-
ship is sufficiently large that neither party wishes
to renege (Telser, 1980). Thus, there is considerable
overlap in the arguments of sociologists and econ-
omists concerning relational governance.
Over the past two decades, relational governance
modes have become more prominent. This devel-
opment has motivated transaction cost analysts to
incorporate them into transaction cost theory’s ex-
planatory framework. High asset specificity should
favor relational governance over market gover-
nance since the former is another way (in addition
to hierarchical governance) to address the safe-
guarding problem posed by asset specificity. How-
ever, Williamson (1991) argued that relational gov-
ernance addresses uncertainty less effectively than
market governance, since relational adaptations
cannot be made unilaterally, as can market adapta-
tions, but require mutual consent. Building consent
takes time, which may be in short supply in uncer-
tain environments. Finally, we also tested whether
Williamson’s proposition that asset specificity is
more important than uncertainty in shaping gover-
nance is supported for relational versus market
governance.
In sum, we tested the following hypotheses:1
Hypothesis 7. As asset specificity increases,
relational governance becomes preferred over
market governance.
Hypothesis 8. As uncertainty (volume, techno-
logical, and behavioral) increases, market gov-
ernance becomes preferred over relational
governance.
1 Although interaction effects have been primarily dis-
cussed in the context of hierarchical governance, there is
no a priori reason to assume that they are not applicable
to the relational governance context. However, we do not
state an explicit hypothesis for the relational governance
case because we discovered only six interactions be-
tween the transaction cost constructs for relational gov-
ernance (of which four were significant).
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Hypothesis 9. Asset specificity has a greater
effect than uncertainty on choices between re-
lational and market governance.
Transaction Cost Theory and Performance
Although the previous hypotheses pertain to
whether firms follow the prescriptions of transac-
tion cost theory, transaction cost theory is explic-
itly normative. Firms that follow its prescriptions
and align organizational form with transaction di-
mensions will economize on transaction costs,
which in turn should translate into performing bet-
ter than those who do not (Williamson, 1985). Note
that this position is not without its critics. For
example, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) expressed sub-
stantial skepticism about the normative implica-
tions of transaction cost theory because of its
strongly self-fulfilling assumptions (for example,
the assumption of opportunism can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy in that opportunistic behavior
increases when hierarchical controls are imposed).
Dyer (1997) criticized transaction cost theory’s ex-
clusive focus on minimizing transaction costs as an
efficiency criterion as governance may also influ-
ence transaction value. In this article, we set out to
assess transaction cost theory’s normative value by
testing the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 10. Hierarchical governance appro-
priately aligned with transaction dimensions
leads to enhanced performance.
Hypothesis 11. Relational governance appro-
priately aligned with transaction dimensions
leads to enhanced performance.
EXPLORATORY MODERATOR ANALYSES
In addition to testing the hypotheses described
above, we conducted two exploratory moderator
analyses. First, we examined differences in the op-
erationalization of the variables in individual stud-
ies contributing to our meta-analysis. It has been
observed that the various transaction cost con-
structs are rather broad (e.g., David & Han, 2004).
Although broad constructs give a theory flexibility
and relevance for a wider range of organizational
contexts, they may be so broad as to subsume com-
ponents whose relationships with other constructs
are, although directionally similar, of differing
magnitudes. We examined this issue by testing
whether the focal relationships proposed in trans-
action cost theory are different for different compo-
nents/operationalizations of a particular construct.
More specifically, we tested for differences in focal
relationships with respect to the following four
transaction cost constructs:
(1) Asset specificity. We compared four con-
structs, testing site specificity (idiosyncratic invest-
ments in facilities) versus physical asset specificity
(idiosyncratic investments in equipment) versus
human asset specificity (idiosyncratic investments
in human capital) versus goodwill asset specificity
(idiosyncratic investments in brand name capital)
(Williamson, 1991).2
(2) Hierarchical governance. Vertical integra-
tion (the performance of a transaction within a
firm) was contrasted with formal governance (gov-
ernance modes characterized by explicit contrac-
tual provisions that simulate the effects of organi-
zational hierarchies) (Heide, 1994).
(3) Relational governance. We contrasted good-
will relational governance (measures emphasizing
socially derived norms and social ties that have
emerged from prior exchange) and calculative rela-
tional governance (measures emphasizing the ra-
tional, calculative origins of relational governance,
particularly stressing expectations of future ex-
changes that prompt present cooperation) (Poppo &
Zenger, 2002).
(4) Performance. Cost-inclusive performance
(measures that encompass the costs of generating
performance, such as profitability) versus cost-ex-
clusive performance (measures that do not directly
encompass the costs of generating performance,
such as sales performance) was our comparison
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
Second, we tested the following ten study char-
acteristics as potential moderators of all focal rela-
tionships: (1) year of publication, (2) year of sam-
ple, (3) publication outlet (top-tier journal versus
other source), (4) data source (primary versus sec-
ondary data), (5) design (cross-sectional versus lon-
gitudinal/experimental), (6) direction of integration
(vertical versus horizontal), (7) domain (purchasing
versus distribution), (8) country (U.S. versus other),
(9) industry type (products versus services), and
(10) product/service type (consumer versus
industrial).
Because we had no a priori reason to believe that
specific operationalizations or study characteristics
would lead to stronger relationships, we do not
offer directional hypotheses for these moderators.
2 Williamson (1991) also identified dedicated assets
and temporal specificity. The number of correlations in-
volving these types of asset specificity was too small for
them to be included in our moderator analysis.
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METHODS
Rationale for Conducting a New Meta-Analysis
To date, six major narrative reviews of transac-
tion cost theory (Boerner & Macher, 2002; Joskow,
1988; Lyons, 1996; Masten & Saussier, 2000; Rind-
fleisch & Heide, 1997; Shelanski & Klein, 1995)
have been presented. Whereas narrative reviews
can marshal and summarize work on a particular
topic, they allow scope for subjective interpreta-
tion. Narrative reviews do not subject the studies
they examine to statistical tests. Thus, they cannot
estimate whether those who conducted the studies
mistook chance results for meaningful ones (and
thus reached falsely positive conclusions based on
sampling error) or used samples so small that
chance factors concealed important results (leading
to falsely negative conclusions) (Hunt, 1997;
Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). Recently, David and Han
(2004) performed the first quantitative review of
the transaction cost literature. Our meta-analysis
builds on and extends their study in several ways.
First, we quantitatively summarize 200 articles in
various disciplines, a number that compares favor-
ably with the 63 articles David and Han reviewed.
Second, those authors relied on the vote-counting
method, which consists of a tabulation of signifi-
cant and nonsignificant findings. This technique is
essentially a dichotomous accept-reject method.
Our approach refines David and Han’s study by
incorporating degree of support (for instance, col-
lectively five p-values of .06 constitute much stron-
ger evidence of a relationship than five p-values of
.45); thus, we are able to provide information on the
magnitude of effects. Third, David and Han’s meta-
analysis treats all studies alike, taking their au-
thors’ results to be as stated. In contrast, we cor-
rected for the influence of statistical artifacts such
as sampling error and measurement error. Fourth,
we give extensive attention to the performance im-
plications of governance choice, a topic David and
Han (2004) only briefly discussed. A general over-
view of our meta-analytic procedures follows.
Literature Search
We used four phases of data collection for iden-
tifying studies (articles, book chapters, and unpub-
lished reports) as input for our meta-analysis. First,
we examined two computerized databases, ABI/
INFORM Global and EconLit.3 Second, manual
searches involved 19 major journals of widely ac-
cepted scholarly value from 1975 (the year in
which Williamson’s Markets and Hierarchies ap-
peared) through 2003.4 In the third phase, we con-
sulted the reference sections of all the articles re-
trieved in the second phase as well as the reference
sections of all major previous reviews of transac-
tion cost theory to identify any studies that we
might have overlooked. In the fourth and final
phase, we contacted 113 researchers in the area in
order to obtain unpublished studies.
We used several decision rules to determine the
studies that would be retained for the meta-analy-
sis. First, although transaction cost theory has been
applied to explain a variety of problems of eco-
nomic organization, ranging from marriage to cor-
porate finance, we restricted this meta-analysis to
make, buy, or ally decisions. Second, a study had to
either (1) report on one or more relationships be-
tween these constructs: asset specificity, volume
uncertainty, technological uncertainty, behavioral
uncertainty, hierarchical (vs. market) governance,
relational (vs. market) governance, and perfor-
mance; or (2) report on one or more relationships
between one of the constructs and one or more of
these control variables: competitive intensity, envi-
ronmental munificence, and firm size (see below).
Table 1 summarizes our definitions of the con-
structs. As noted above, transaction frequency was
not included, because the number of correlations
involving it was too low (more specifically, no cor-
relations were available between transaction fre-
quency and volume and technological uncertainty).
Third, a study had to report sample sizes and an
3 We used the following search terms: “transaction*
cost*” (where the asterisk indicates that variations on the
ending of the word are permitted) plus at least one addi-
tional substantive keyword and at least one methodolog-
ical keyword (cf. David & Han, 2004). The additional
substantive keywords included were “organization,”
“governance,” “opportunism,” “rationality,” “integra-
tion,” “hierarch*,” “make-or-buy,” “merger*,” “rela-
tional,” “cooperation,” “alliance*,” “uncertainty,” “asset
specificity,” “transaction-specific,” “performance,” and
“Williamson.” The methodological keywords introduced
were “data,” “empirical,” “test,” “statistical,” “finding*,”
“result*,” and “evidence.”
4 The following journals were searched: Academy of
Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly,
American Economic Review, American Journal of Soci-
ology, American Sociological Review, Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, International Journal of Research in Marketing,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal
of International Business Studies, Journal of Law and
Economics, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,
Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research,
Management Science, Marketing Science, Organization
Science, Rand Journal of Economics, Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics, and Strategic Management Journal.
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outcome statistic (e.g., r, univariate F, t, 2) that
allowed the computation of a correlation coeffi-
cient with the formulas provided by Hunter and
Schmidt (1990: 272).
We read each article in the final set and extracted
data on the variables of interest, including outcome
statistics, sample sizes, statistical artifacts, and
study characteristics. The first author coded all the
articles and categorized all harvested correlations
on the basis of the construct operationalizations.
We ensured investigator blindness in making deter-
minations that could substantially affect our find-
ings by keeping the methods sections separated
from the results sections and by having the papers
photocopied in such a way that their origins could
not be determined (Orwin, 1994). Intercoder agree-
ment in extracting information from primary stud-
ies is an important concern in meta-analysis; it is
not a problem for calculation-based coding (e.g.,
coding effect sizes, sample sizes, and reliabilities)
but may be a problem for judgment-based coding,
such as categorizing operationalizations into trans-
action cost constructs (Heller, Watson, & Ilies,
2004). To address this issue, the second and the
third authors rechecked those categorizations; in-
terrater agreement was 98 percent, and we resolved
remaining discrepancies via discussion and reach-
ing consensus.
Data Set
Nonindependence. We used the following three
criteria to ensure an acceptable level of indepen-
dence among correlation coefficients in our data-
base: (1) For studies with multiple independent
samples, correlations from each sample were in-
TABLE 1
Definitions of the Transaction Cost Constructs and Representative Measures
Transaction Cost
Construct Definition and Measures
Asset specificity Construct definition: The degree to which the assets that support a given
transaction are tailored to it and cannot be redeployed easily outside
of a particular exchange relationship. Includes investments in
buildings, equipment, learning, and/or brand name capital that are
specific to a particular relationship.
Representative measures: Anderson (1985); Heide & John (1990).
Volume uncertainty Construct definition: The inability to accurately forecast the volume
requirements in a relationship.
Representative measures: Anderson & Schmittlein (1984); John & Weitz
(1988).
Technological uncertainty Construct definition: The inability to accurately forecast the technical
requirements in a relationship.
Representative measures: Stump & Heide (1996); Walker & Weber
(1984).
Behavioral uncertainty Construct definition: The degree of difficulty in verifying whether
compliance with established agreements has occurred.
Representative measures: Anderson (1985); Poppo & Zenger (2002).
Hierarchical governance Construct definition: Governance modes that, by means of an authority
structure, provide one exchange partner with the ability to develop
rules, give instructions, and in effect impose decisions on the others.
Includes vertical integration and formal governance modes that are
characterized by explicit contractual provisions that simulate the
effects of organizational hierarchies.
Representative measures: Parkhe (1993); Walker & Weber (1987).
Relational governance Construct definition: Governance modes characterized by the parties to a
transaction jointly developing policies directed toward the
achievement of certain goals.
Representative measures: Carson, Madhok, Varman, & John (2003);
Subramani & Venkatraman (2003).
Performance Construct definition: Includes “cost-inclusive” performance measures
(measures that encompass the costs of generating performance, such as
level and growth of profit and abnormal stock returns) and “cost-
exclusive” performance measures (measures that do not directly
encompass the costs of generating performance, such as level and
growth of sales).
Representative measures: Dyer (1996); Murray & Kotabe (1999).
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cluded. (2) If a sample reported more than one
correlation for a single relationship (because it in-
volved multiple operationalizations of the same
construct, for instance), we combined these corre-
lations into a linear composite correlation using
formulas provided by Hunter and Schmidt (1990:
457–460). Reliabilities of the newly formed com-
bined measures were computed accordingly with
the Mosier formula (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990: 461).
In the few cases where this was not possible, we
averaged the correlations and entered only the
average into the meta-analysis. (3) When studies
were based on the same or on partially overlap-
ping data sets, we were careful not to include
correlations between two identical variables from
more than one study. In such cases, preference
was given to the correlation that was based on the
larger sample size.
Outliers. We computed Hufcutt and Arthur’s
(1995) sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy sta-
tistic to detect outlying observations (i.e., correla-
tions). On the basis of these analyses, we identified
28 outliers. These were subsequently dropped from
the data set. This exclusion resulted in a final data
set of 557 correlations from 200 studies containing
209 independent samples and having a total sam-
ple size of 91,006. Of the studies used, 8 were
unpublished papers at the time our meta-analysis
was conducted, and 2 were in press.
Meta-Analytic Calculations
Our meta-analyses were conducted via Hunter
and Schmidt’s (1990) approach, which allows for
the correction of statistical artifacts and thus pro-
vides a relatively accurate estimate of the true av-
erage strength and variance of a relationship in the
population of interest. We corrected the retrieved
correlation coefficients (r’s) for the biasing influ-
ence of eight statistical artifacts: (1) sampling error,
(2) measurement error in the dependent variable,
(3) measurement error in the independent variable,
(4) dichotomization of a continuous dependent
variable, (5) dichotomization of a continuous inde-
pendent variable, (6) range restriction in a depen-
dent dichotomous variable, (7) range restriction in
an independent dichotomous variable, and (8)
downward bias in the retrieved correlation coeffi-
cient as a measure of the population correlation.
For each data point (i.e., for each r), we had
information on artifacts 4–8. Following Hunter and
Schmidt (1990), we first corrected each data point
for these artifacts. Next, the partially corrected data
points were meta-analyzed, a process that yielded a
sample-size-weighted mean correlation and vari-
ance, both corrected for artifacts 4–8. In this step,
the variance in correlations was also corrected for
sampling error (artifact 1). Third, we corrected the
mean and variance obtained in step 2 for measure-
ment error (artifacts 2–3), using the method of arti-
fact distributions (see Hunter and Schmidt [1990]
for details), as this information was not available
for all data points. These corrections yielded the
following summary statistics for each bivariate
analysis of interest to our study: the average cor-
rected correlation (average rho; ), the correspond-
ing standard deviation of the corrected correlations
in the population (s.d.), the 95% confidence inter-
val around the average rho (CI), and the true resid-
ual variance in the observed correlations (s.d.res)
after removal of variance due to artifacts 1–8.
We further examined whether the individual cor-
relations on which the average correlations were
based were drawn from the same population using
two tests (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990): (1) the 75%
rule-of-thumb, stating that looking for moderators
is warranted if statistical artifacts explain less than
75 percent of the observed variance in correlations,
and (2) Hunter and Schmidt’s chi-square test, a
statistical significance test for whether the ob-
served variation is greater than that expected by
chance; a significant value suggests the presence of
possible moderator variables. Finally, we tested for
possible publication bias using the “trim and fill
method” (Duval & Tweedie, 2000). Publication bias
may occur if studies producing null results or ef-
fects opposite those envisaged are less likely to be
accepted for publication (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).
Testing Transaction Cost Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1–11 required that we simulta-
neously test a system of equations that explained in
turn the impact of the transaction dimensions on a
firm’s governance choice and the relationship be-
tween governance choice and performance. Testing
these equations independently would introduce bi-
ased estimates due to the endogeneity of gover-
nance choice in the performance equation (Hamil-
ton & Nickerson, 2003). For hierarchical (vs.
market) governance, we estimated the following
system of equations:
Hierarchical vs. market governance
 1 asset specificity  2 volume uncertainty
 3 technological uncertainty
 4 behavioral uncertainty  , (1)
and
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Performance
 5 hierarchical vs. market governance
 6 size  7 competitive intensity
 8 environmental munificence  . (2)
In these equations, we included two industry
variables and one firm variable (competitive inten-
sity, environmental munificence, and firm size, re-
spectively) to control for other key factors that may
affect performance (Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace,
2002). A similar system of equations was estimated
for examining how the transaction dimensions af-
fected relational governance choice and how rela-
tional governance influenced performance.
Our meta-analytic path analysis required that in
addition to estimating the correlations between the
predictors and the criterion variable, we also esti-
mate the correlations between all predictors (cf.
Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999). Thus, we
also conducted meta-analyses relating all predic-
tors to one another using data from all primary
studies in our database providing this information.
We corrected correlations between the predictors
for statistical artifacts and removed outliers using
the procedures described in the previous section.
Our analyses were conducted using the full in-
formation maximum likelihood method and LIS-
REL software on the meta-analytically derived cor-
relation matrix. This estimation method explicitly
accounted for potential simultaneity bias in the
choice of governance mode and performance
(Greene, 2000). Given the variability in sample
sizes associated with each correlation coefficient in
the meta-analytic correlation matrix, we based this
analysis on the harmonic mean of the sample sizes
comprising each entry in the meta-analytic correla-
tion matrix (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995) (harmonic
mean N  1,265 [1,075] for hierarchical [relational]
governance).
Since our meta-analytic path analysis was based
on a pooled correlation, we could only test relation-
ships for which an adequate number of correlations
appeared in the existing literature. Since correla-
tions involving interactions between transaction
dimensions were seldom available, we were not
able to include interaction effects (Hypothesis 6)
between the transaction dimensions in our path
model. As an alternative, we employed a vote-
counting procedure whereby prior studies are cat-
egorized on the basis of the direction and signifi-
cance of the findings (Bushman, 1994). A
nonparametric sign test, which tests the hypothesis
that the interaction effects between the transaction
dimensions from a collection of k independent
studies are all zero (H0:   .5, where  is the
proportion of significant interaction effects in the
population), was employed.
Exploratory Moderator Analyses
For continuous moderators (e.g., year of publica-
tion), we correlated the moderators with the cor-
rected correlations (’s). For categorical moderators
(e.g., data source), using the Z-statistic we divided
the data into subsets based on the level of the
moderator in question and determined whether the
average rho statistically differed between subsets
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).
RESULTS
Bivariate Correlations
In Table 2, for the three dependent variables ex-
amined in this article (hierarchical versus market
governance, relational versus market governance,
and performance), for each predictor we report: the
number of data points (k), total sample size (N), the
average rho (), the standard deviation of rho in the
population (s.d.), and the 95% confidence interval
around the mean rho (CI). We also report the true
residual variance in the observed correlations
(s.d.res) with variance due to artifacts 1–8 removed,
the percentage of observed variance accounted for
by artifacts, and Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990) chi-
square test for heterogeneity (Q).
Heterogeneity for the various relations was sig-
nificant. Absence of heterogeneity would have
been preferable for testing Hypotheses 1–11, but
did the degree of heterogeneity reported in Table
2 preclude quantitative meta-analyses? Drawing
on recent work by Cortina (2003), we argue that
this is not the case. Cortina analyzed 1,647 meta-
analyses and reported a mean residual standard
deviation (s.d.res) of .122. Our mean residual
standard deviation is .129. More importantly, he
developed a cut-off value for an acceptable stan-
dard deviation of rho in a population (s.d.). Ac-
cording to Cortina (2003), if s.d. is less than .05,
then there is absolutely no reason to be con-
cerned about interpretation of effect sizes. On the
other hand, if s.d. is larger than .265 (a number
Cortina labeled “the point of no return”), then the
average correlation must be regarded as uninter-
pretable because it is a mean of sample values
that are no less discrepant than would be values
taken from k populations. The area in between
.05 and .265 is a grey zone: analyses can proceed,
though a note of caution is in place. The s.d.’s of
our focal relationships varied between .10 and
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.21. Nevertheless, concern about heterogeneity
was legitimate, and the Q-statistics for the meta-
analyses that populated the pooled correlation
matrix indicated that most relationships were
moderated by unknown variables.
Assessing Publication Bias
For each focal relationship, we applied the trim
and fill method to assess publication bias (Duval &
Tweedie, 2000). For 11 out of 14 relationships re-
ported in Table 2, we estimated the number of
studies missing because of publication bias to be 0
(using the estimator R0; see Duval and Tweedie
[2000] for details). For the remaining three relation-
ships (i.e., asset specificity, volume uncertainty,
and technological uncertainty with hierarchical
governance), the number of studies missing be-
cause of publication bias was estimated to be 2, 1,
and 3, respectively. Only the last number was sig-
nificant (p  .05). We then imputed the missing
values to derive effect-size estimates adjusted for
the missing studies, finding the adjusted (original;
cf. Table 2) estimates to be .16 (.16), .03 (.04), and
.04 (.08), respectively. The extent of bias is very
modest and did not affect any of our research con-
clusions reported below. In sum, publication bias
did not appear to be a serious issue.
Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix
Table 3 presents the meta-analytic correlation
matrix. Each cell in this matrix represents one in-
dividual meta-analysis. Thus, the table is the cul-
mination of 44 individual meta-analyses. Each en-
try in the matrix contains a sample-size-weighted,
average correlation coefficient corrected for arti-
facts (), the standard deviation of rho (s.d.), the
total sample size for each correlation (N), and the
number of samples included in each weighted av-
erage (k). Standard deviations marked with a dag-
ger indicate relationships in which moderator vari-
ables are present. With the exception of one
relationship involving a control variable, all rela-
tionships included data from at least two samples
(Ns  194–40,444). All focal relationships in-
cluded data from at least three samples (Ns  576–
40,444).5 Note that no sample included all variables
5 Some relationships in our meta-analytic correlation
matrix were based on rather small numbers of samples
and sample sizes. Thus, the magnitudes of those relation-
ships should be interpreted with caution. However, it
should be noted that the problem of small numbers of
samples and small sample sizes is less likely to seriously
affect the estimates of average correlations () than it is to
influence estimates of the standard deviation (s.d.) of
the correlations (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).
TABLE 2
Meta-Analytic Results for the Focal Relationshipsa
Predictor k N  s.d. CI 5% CI 95% s.d.res
% Variance
Accounted
For Q
Predictors of hierarchical governance
Asset specificity 75 40,444 .16 .16 .09 .16 .13 10.7 756.6*
Volume uncertainty 16 3,315 .04 .14 .03 .09 .10 31.7 50.8*
Technological uncertainty 7 2,991 .08 .11 .13 .01 .08 25.8 27.6*
Behavioral uncertainty 20 7,238 .13 .15 .04 .15 .11 19.0 109.6*
Predictors of relational governance
Asset specificity 51 11,681 .28 .21 .17 .27 .17 12.6 432.6*
Volume uncertainty 6 1,430 .27 .19 .34 .08 .15 15.4 41.2*
Technological uncertainty 7 2,137 .07 .17 .17 .05 .14 14.9 47.3*
Behavioral uncertainty 9 2,121 .03 .20 .13 .09 .15 15.1 59.7*
Predictors of performance
Hierarchical governance 22 8,246 .09 .13 .03 .12 .10 20.0 112.0*
Cost-inclusive performance 16 7,293 .07 .10 .01 .11 .08 25.6 63.3*
Cost-exclusive performance 10 1,472 .20 .21 .04 .27 .17 19.5 53.2*
Relational governance 27 5,149 .44 .21 .31 .45 .18 11.8 259.5*
Cost-inclusive performance 15 3,279 .40 .22 .24 .45 .19 9.4 176.2*
Cost-exclusive performance 10 1,630 .57 .12 .40 .55 .10 32.2 40.9*
a k number of data points; N total sample size;   estimate of corrected population correlation; s.d. estimated standard deviation
of corrected correlations in population; CI 5%  lower bound of confidence interval for ; CI 95%  upper bound of confidence interval
for ; s.d.res  residual standard deviation; % variance accounted for  percentage of observed variance accounted for by statistical
artifacts; Q  Hunter and Schmidt’s chi-square test for heterogeneity.
* p  .05
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of interest. Thus, the number of samples contribut-
ing to each meta-analytic correlation is far fewer
than the total number of samples.
Transaction Cost Theory and Hierarchical
Governance
Table 4 presents the results for the path analysis.
Since path analysis controls for redundancy in
measures of independent variables, our analysis
provides a more precise test of our hypotheses than
could be obtained by bivariate analyses. Asset spec-
ificity (  .19, p  .01), volume uncertainty ( 
.07, p  .01), and behavioral uncertainty (  .13,
p  .01) led to a choice of hierarchical governance
over market governance, supporting Hypotheses 1,
2, and 4. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, technolog-
ical uncertainty increased the likelihood of market
governance (  .14, p  .01).
Whereas volume uncertainty had a weaker im-
pact on governance choice than asset specificity
(2[1]  10.96, p  .01), the effects of technolog-
ical uncertainty (2[1]  2.88, p  .09) and behav-
ioral uncertainty (2[1]  2.77, p  .10) were not
significantly different in magnitude from the effect
of asset specificity. Moreover, the joint effect of
uncertainty (volume, technological, and behav-
ioral) on governance choice was larger than that of
asset specificity (2[1]  12.56, p  .01). Thus,
Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Ten out of 21 studies in our meta-analytical da-
tabase that reported interaction results found sig-
nificant interaction effects between the transaction
dimensions in their models of hierarchical gover-
nance choice. The sign test described above yielded
an estimate of pi ( ) of .48 (10/21), which corre-
sponded to a cumulative probability of .5 from a
binomial table. Thus, we could not reject the null
hypothesis that the interaction effects between the
transaction dimensions were all zero. In addition, it
is plausible that 10 out of 21 was the upper limit for
the number of studies finding interaction effects, as
some of the studies in our meta-analytical database
might have tested for interaction effects but not
reported nonsignificant findings (the so-called file
drawer problem). The preponderance of empirical
evidence therefore suggested that the transaction
dimensions worked primarily through main effects
and did not support Hypothesis 6.
Transaction Cost Theory and Relational
Governance
Supporting transaction cost theory’s predictions,
asset specificity (  .29, p  .01) motivated rela-
tional governance over market governance, but vol-
TABLE 4
Results of Analyses of Transaction Cost Hypothesesa
Predictors
Hierarchical
Governance
Performance for
Hierarchical
Governance
Relational
Governance
Performance for
Relational
Governance
 p  p a p  p
Transaction dimensions
Asset specificity .19  .01 .29  .01
Volume uncertainty .07  .01 .24  .01
Technological uncertainty .14  .01 .14  .01
Behavioral uncertainty .13  .01 .05 .01
Governance choice
Hierarchical governance .10  .01
Relational governance .44  .01
Control variables
Competitive intensity .02  .10 .04  .10
Environmental munificence .15  .01 .04  .10
Firm size .02  .10 .03  .10
Harmonic mean N 1,265 1,075
2 (7) 162.65 278.07
GFI .97 .95
RMSR .05 .06
a A positive beta coefficient () signifies that the higher the corresponding variable, the more likely it is that hierarchical or relational
governance will be chosen. Negative coefficients indicate that higher values of the corresponding variable encourage market governance.
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ume uncertainty (  .24, p  .01), technological
uncertainty (  .14, p  .01), and behavioral
uncertainty (  .05, p  .01) led to market gov-
ernance. Thus, Hypotheses 7 and 8 were also sup-
ported. Since all transaction dimensions had a sig-
nificant effect on the choice between relational as
opposed to market governance, and the direction of
the effects was consistent with transaction cost the-
ory predictions, this finding attests to the relevance
of transaction cost theory in shaping relational gov-
ernance as well. Asset specificity had a greater im-
pact on governance choice than technological un-
certainty (2[1]  19.12, p  .01) and behavioral
uncertainty (2[1] 36.55, p .01), but the effects
of asset specificity and volume uncertainty were
not significantly different in magnitude (2[1] 
1.45, p  .22). However, the overall (joint) effect of
the three uncertainty constructs on the choice be-
tween relational governance and market gover-
nance was larger than the effect of asset specificity
(2[1]  6.35, p  .01). Therefore, Hypothesis 9
was not supported.
Transaction Cost Theory and Performance
The empirical results provide support for Hypoth-
eses 10 and 11. The coefficient estimates for the gov-
ernance choice–performance relationship were posi-
tive and highly significant, for both hierarchical ( 
.10, p  .01) and relational governance (  .44, p 
.01), which indicated that choosing hierarchical or
relational governance in response to transaction haz-
ards increases performance.
Exploratory Moderator Analyses
We tested whether the focal relationships pro-
posed by transaction cost theory were different for
different operationalizations of four transaction
cost constructs and ten study characteristics, con-
ducting a total of 84 analyses.6 With respect to
hierarchical governance, with one exception no sig-
nificant differences were found for vertical integra-
tion as opposed to formal governance, the excep-
tion being the relationship with volume
uncertainty. However, for both vertical integration
and formal governance, the correlation with vol-
ume uncertainty was positive (  .02 for vertical
integration versus .15 for formal governance). The
average corrected correlations ( ’s) were signifi-
cantly (p  .05) different for the relationships be-
tween governance choice and cost-inclusive versus
cost-exclusive performance, suggesting that the
how performance is measured moderates the
strength of relations (hierarchical governance:  
.07 for cost-inclusive performance versus .20 for
cost-exclusive performance; relational governance:
  .40 for cost-inclusive performance versus .57
for cost-exclusive performance). We therefore rees-
timated our system of equations, estimating Equa-
tion 2 separately for cost-inclusive and cost-exclu-
sive performance. We found that the effect of
governance mode (hierarchical or relational) on
performance did not differ significantly (p  .05)
by type of performance. The moderators pertaining
to different operationalizations of asset specificity
and relational governance were not significant.
With respect to the study characteristics, 13 out
of 71 effects were significant (p  .05). We discov-
ered, however, no systematic pattern in the signif-
icant effects, either in terms of the moderator being
tested, or in terms of the relationship being ana-
lyzed. Thus, the study characteristics we examined
could not adequately explain the heterogeneity in
effect sizes.
DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Despite what almost 30 years ago may have ap-
peared to be insurmountable obstacles to acquiring
the relevant data, today transaction cost theory
stands on a remarkably broad empirical founda-
tion. Through this meta-analysis, we have contrib-
uted to the transaction cost literature in the follow-
ing ways: First, by psychometrically meta-
analyzing the results from 200 empirical papers on
transaction cost theory—papers that all concerned
the make, buy, or ally decision and that represented
209 independent samples and 557 correla-
tions—we were able to test a comprehensive model
that no individual study has tested. Second, we
found no evidence supporting the superior predic-
tive power of asset specificity over uncertainty, in
contrast to previous reviews that have supported
Williamson’s contention that asset specificity is the
critical driver of governance choice. Third, we
showed that the transaction cost approach can be
used to explain relational governance modes, a re-
sult that differs from David and Han’s (2004) con-
clusion that transaction cost theory is less effective
in predicting the choice of relational governance
over market governance than in predicting the
choice of hierarchy over markets. Fourth, we rebut-
ted critics and found strong support for the norma-
tive implications of transaction cost theory.
Although we endeavored to overcome depth and
6 To ensure a minimum stability of the results, we only
tested moderator effects when at least three observations
were available for each level of the moderator variable.
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breadth limitations of previous reviews of the
transaction cost literature, limitations to our cover-
age remain. First, we only included studies related
to make, buy, or ally decisions. Second, the data-
bases used (ABI/Inform and EconLit) did not con-
tain all relevant studies. Third, we used only stud-
ies whose results could be converted to correlation
coefficients. Fourth, we did not specifically at-
tempt to include dissertations on transaction costs.
We did find, however, that a number of the pub-
lished articles were based on dissertations. Despite
these limitations, we have performed the largest
quantitative review of transaction cost theory as it
applies to interorganizational relationships in or-
der to take stock of what is known, answer some
persisting questions, and point out directions for
future research.
Hierarchical Governance
Williamson originally intended transaction cost
theory to predict the choice between markets and
hierarchies. Our meta-analysis shows that the the-
ory performs well with respect to main effects, pro-
vided refinements in conceptualizing uncertainty
are incorporated. We found that asset specificity,
volume uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty
promote a choice of hierarchical governance over
market governance. In contrast, in the face of tech-
nological uncertainty, market governance is pre-
ferred over hierarchical governance.
In two areas, however, Williamson’s claims were
not supported. First, we were unable to demon-
strate superior predictive power for asset specific-
ity. Thus, Williamson’s contention that asset spec-
ificity is the “locomotive” was unsubstantiated. A
future area of empirical investigation might be to
assess the conditions under which asset specificity
may have greater impact than uncertainty.
Second, Williamson argued for the interactive
effects of the transaction dimensions rather than
the main effects. However, empirical testing has
primarily concentrated on the main effects. Only 21
studies reported testing for interactions, and 10 of
these reported significant effects. Thus, we were
unable to reject the null hypothesis. These results
must be considered in light of the reasonable as-
sumption that some (other) studies probably did
test for interactions but did not report insignificant
results. There are at least two possible reasons for
why interaction effects were not found. First, the
search for empirical evidence of interaction effects
may have been disappointing because of the low
power of interaction effects (McClelland & Judd,
1993). Second, the transaction dimensions may op-
erate primarily through main effects. Future re-
search should examine which is true by, for exam-
ple, using experiments in which asset specificity
and uncertainty are manipulated by using role-
playing scenarios.
Enormous empirical attention has been paid to
the asset specificity construct. Empirical investiga-
tions of asset specificity in the future will fruitfully
deepen researchers’ understanding only if they go
beyond simply demonstrating a main effect into the
more complex unresolved questions such as distin-
guishing between transaction cost reasoning and
alternative arguments. Different theories some-
times make the same predictions but specify quite
different underlying motivations. For example,
does asset specificity motivate hierarchical gover-
nance because it renders contract formation trou-
blesome and potentially exposes firms to opportu-
nistic behavior, or do firms integrate because such
internalization facilitates the coordination of asset-
specific activities in their quest for sustainable
competitive advantage (as in knowledge-based the-
ories)? In a similar vein, do firms integrate in the
presence of transaction-specific assets to econo-
mize on the costs resulting from planning and
adapting contracts because of a continuing trading
relationship, or do they integrate to reduce resource
dependence? Given the congruity of several ante-
cedents of governance choice over competing the-
ories, in future empirical work researchers should
attempt to gain insight into the underlying mecha-
nisms driving governance decisions, by measuring
the managerial motivations mediating the relation-
ships between transaction dimensions and gover-
nance mode chosen. Schilling and Steensma (2002)
have taken a step in this direction.
According to Williamson, transaction frequency
makes hierarchical governance more likely because
the overhead costs of hierarchical governance
should be easier to recover for recurring transac-
tions. Unfortunately, the available correlations re-
lating to transaction frequency were too few to in-
clude this construct in our meta-analysis.
Transaction frequency is deserving of greater em-
pirical attention.
Relational Governance
Our meta-analysis showed strong support for the
application of transaction cost theory to relational
governance. In fact, the variance explained was
higher than for hierarchical versus market gover-
nance. This higher variance is probably seen be-
cause relational governance is usually measured as
a perceptual variable, while the choice of hierarchi-
cal versus market governance is usually measured
with a secondary data indicant. Thus, there is sub-
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stantially less shared method variance between the
independent and dependent variables when re-
searchers examine hierarchical (vs. market)
governance.
Our test examined relational versus market gov-
ernance choices. We were unable to model rela-
tional versus hierarchy choices because there were
simply too few correlations between relational gov-
ernance versus hierarchical governance and the
constructs in our model. We encourage future re-
search to further pursue this area.
Following Williamson, empirical researchers
have considered market, hierarchical, and rela-
tional governance as discrete and mutually exclu-
sive governance modes rather than as comple-
ments. To a large extent, the validity of this
approach depends on what one considers a trans-
action. Often, when a firm outsources a process, the
decision is made that while a third party will per-
form part of the contract, the firm will keep a small
percentage in-house to retain learning. This deci-
sion allows for a more informed (as one knows the
true costs of doing the activity and the challenges)
and balanced (as a threat, one can take the process
in-house) negotiation when the contract is up for
renegotiation. The exploration of governance
modes as complements is a fertile area for empiri-
cal work.
Although we found that each of the three dimen-
sions of uncertainty rendered relational governance
a less preferred option, this distinction may be con-
ditional upon the network in which a particular
dyadic exchange is embedded. More specifically,
the negative effects of uncertainty on relational
governance attest to relational governance’s poten-
tial dark side in that it may lock firms into unpro-
ductive relationships or preclude partnering with
other viable firms. By forging multiple alliances,
each of which is viewed as a “real option,” firms
can isolate themselves from such lock-in effects
(Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). They may main-
tain their flexibility by using alliances as a portfolio
of options. As such, relational governance may be-
come a more suitable alternative than market gov-
ernance in the face of high volume or technological
uncertainty if it is embedded in a network that
allows a firm to flexibly use different specific kinds
of expertise and production facilities from the var-
ious firms in the network (Hage & Alter, 1997).
Behavioral uncertainty is also expected to have a
differential effect on relational governance in the
context of a network. More specifically, one would
expect a positive effect of behavioral uncertainty on
relational governance, since the social mechanisms
of reputation and collective sanctions safeguard
specific exchanges in the network by dispersing
information about behavior and increasing the
costs of malfeasance (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti,
1997). Collective sanctions (i.e., group members
punishing other members who violate group
norms, values, or goals) reduce behavioral uncer-
tainty by increasing the costs of opportunism and
by decreasing the costs of monitoring to any indi-
vidual party. Similarly, reputations—which have
economic consequences for participants in net-
works—reduce behavioral uncertainty by provid-
ing information about the reliability and goodwill
of others.
Future empirical research should move transac-
tion cost theory beyond a dyadic focus and apply a
network lens. Although the transaction cost per-
spective stresses the efficacy benefits gained from
reducing the governance cost of a transaction, a
network approach allows consideration of the ben-
efits from optimizing not just a single relationship
but a firm’s entire network of relationships.
Transaction Cost Theory and Performance
We found support for the performance implica-
tions of transaction cost theory. Choosing hierar-
chical or relational governance in response to trans-
action hazards increases performance. We further
found that the effect of relational governance on
performance was substantively larger than that of
hierarchical governance. This result may be attrib-
utable to at least three not mutually exclusive
causes. First, there is the fact that relational gover-
nance measures, as opposed to hierarchical gover-
nance measures, often confound a governance de-
cision per se with the quality of that decision (e.g.,
achieving a collaborative exchange). Another plau-
sible explanation is the uniqueness of relational
governance as a governance mechanism because it
not only minimizes transaction costs but also cre-
ates value in the exchange relationship through
superior information sharing (Dyer & Chu, 2003). A
third explanation is possible bias due to shared
method variance. In general, the relational gover-
nance studies in our review employed multi-item
perceptual measures to tap both relational gover-
nance and performance. In contrast, common meth-
ods were less of a problem for hierarchical gover-
nance. The studies in our review measured
hierarchical governance using “objective” dichoto-
mous measures (e.g., a dummy variable represent-
ing whether hierarchical or market governance had
been chosen), whereas they measured performance
using either perceptual measures or secondary data
indicants. Future research should investigate
which cause or causes give rise to the larger effect
of relational governance. To disentangle the effect
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of shared method variance from that of substantive
causes, longitudinal studies using recent advances
in structural equation modeling are needed (Baum-
gartner & Steenkamp, 2006).
Although our meta-analysis supports the asser-
tion that transaction cost considerations are impor-
tant drivers of governance choice, most of the stud-
ies included in our meta-analysis were limited to
documenting whether firms followed transaction
cost descriptions rather than to examining how
firm decisions impacted performance. The studies
that did examine performance differences between
governance modes usually failed to appropriately
correct for the selective adoption of governance
modes. Consequently, with a few exceptions, this
research ends up answering the question “How
does the performance of firms that adopt a partic-
ular governance arrangement compare to that of
firms that adopt alternatives to that arrangement?”
when the correct question, from a governance-
choice perspective is “How does the performance
of a firm that adopted a particular arrangement
compare with how that same firm would have per-
formed had it adopted an alternative?” (Masten,
1993: 124). Greater effort to understand the influ-
ence of governance choice on performance is
needed.
Related to the above performance question, our
study looked at the performance implications of
alignment and showed that hierarchical and rela-
tional governance appropriately aligned with the
transaction dimensions led to enhanced perfor-
mance. What we did not study was the cost of
misalignment. Some promising research emerging
in this area has suggested that the performance
implications from deviations of optimal alignment
may be asymmetric (Leiblein et al., 2002; Sampson,
2004).
Also, a more complete understanding of gover-
nance choice requires a greater sensitivity to the
interdependence of production and exchange re-
lations. If hierarchies are superior to markets for
reasons of efficiency, this superiority may well be
due not just to transaction cost reductions but
also to productivity-enhancing factors tied to su-
perior skills and knowledge. Production cost
measurements should always be comparisons of
in-house and supplier costs. Unfortunately, of
the studies in our meta-analysis, only a few have
measured production costs in this way. As a re-
sult, the number of correlations involving the
appropriate production cost measure and the
other constructs in our models was not suffi-
ciently large to warrant its inclusion.
Methodological Findings
Our examination of the measures used in trans-
action costs research led to several observations.
Often, the empirical studies were limited by single-
item survey measurement and proxy measures. The
use of proxy measures was most apparent in the
studies that investigated transaction frequency.
Some studies have treated frequency as synony-
mous with business size, while others have mea-
sured frequency as an indicator of production
costs. However, neither of these captures the mean-
ing Williamson afforded the construct.
The literature is further complicated by the
presentation of measures without a description of
psychometric properties, rendering it difficult to
assess the quality of measures and/or their rela-
tionships to other variables. In addition, the ma-
jority of studies analyzed were correlational, and
causal interpretations should therefore be made
cautiously. Notable exceptions include the study
by Ohanian (1994), who estimated changes in the
pattern of vertical integration over time. Other
notable exceptions are Silverman, Nickerson, and
Freeman (1997) and Nickerson and Silverman
(2003), studies that respectively explore the or-
ganizational failure and adaptive actions over
time of inappropriately aligned organizations;
both studies take advantage of the natural exper-
iment associated with a deregulatory shock
(which ensures unusually high environmental
change and consequently a need for organization-
al change). To remedy these problems, future
research should use multi-item scales, provide
adequate data on reliability, and examine longi-
tudinal data.
In sum, transaction cost theory is well estab-
lished and empirically corroborated. Yet, for all its
depth and scope, transaction cost theory has only
begun to explore the variety and complexity of
organizational forms. There is still much to learn. It
is hoped that further research will explore some of
the above issues in more detail.
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